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Banking and Payment System Stability in an Electronic Money World
I. Introduction
Today we observe the rapid development of information-processing systems that are
likely to displace, over time, many of the systems by which payment-related information is
communicated.   Indeed, stored-value systems, as well as credit-based and deposit account-based
systems, that communicate instructions or transfer value over open communication and computer
networks represent new techniques (based on encryption schemes) to initiate payments.  These
new techniques hold a great deal of promise in that they potentially offer added convenience to
the consumer.  This promise is qualified by the question of whether these new means of payment
add to the perennial risks of instability in the payment system and the banking system. 
The new forms of payment being developed can be broadly grouped into three categories:
those that allow payments to be made using credit cards over communication systems such as the
Internet; those, like the electronic check, that involve transmitting instructions to banks to
transfer funds from one deposit account to another; and those, like some forms of stored-value
cards and digital cash, that represent the electronic equivalent of bank notes.   For the time being
we will dub all these systems that transmit payment or payment instructions over open networks
“emoney.”
Many of these new systems will clear and settle the system’s payments in a special-
purpose private bank--a clearinghouse.  Issues of settlement risk in clearinghouses are reasonably
well understood as a practical matter.  Several principles are practically implemented in theAmong these principles are “Know your counterparty”; “Manage counterparty risk
1
through bilateral net debit limitations”; “Manage system risk with limits on total, multilateral net
debit limits.”
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operating rules of many clearinghouses, including CHIPS.   These rules attempt to ensure
1
adequate liquidity of the settlement facility, especially in times when members of the system
experience financial distress.  This “settlement risk” is indeed a concern for the new payment
systems, and we will review this concern in greater depth.
However, it is not conventional settlement risk that poses a novel threat to the smooth
operation of the payment and banking systems from the introduction and widespread acceptance
of emoney. Rather, the threat arises principally from the uncertainty regarding fraud and
operational risks to the systems because the uncertainty can lead to runs that risk large-scale
disruption to the banking and payment systems.  
These risks may be exacerbated by the type of industrial organization emerging in the
emoney industry.  The American banking industry is unique for its decentralization.  The current
trend of consolidation in banking is changing this feature of American banking only slowly.  
Payments have been cleared and settled through clearinghouses (and the Fed) and correspondent
networks that were, for the most part, invisible to the retail customer.  The new means of
payment, in contrast, are provided to a large extent in “branded networks,” in which the
clearinghouse and its identity have a strong retail presence and are the foremost link with the
product in the consumer’s mind.  This type of organization in payments is illustrated today by the
credit card associations, Visa and MasterCard.  The nature of competition in which such
networks engage, in conjunction with the liquidity, fraud, and operational risks to which they are
subject, can also pose risks to the stability of the payments system.4
The next section will briefly review some of the likely forms of emoney in more detail. 
In the third section I will provide an overview of systemic payment risk issues and their
applicability to emoney systems.  In section four, I will review the variant experiences of
payment and banking system stability in the Free Banking era and in the National Bank period. In
section five I will consider the effects of emoney branded network competition on the stability of
the payment system.  I will conclude the paper in section six with a discussion of lessons learned
concerning banking and payment system regulation and control.
II.  Forms of Emoney and Emoney Firms
In some ways, the emoney world is here now. Indeed it has been for some time in the
guise of Fedwire and the automated clearing house (ACH), automated teller machines (ATMs),
and point-of-sale (POS) debit card networks and credit card networks. These electronic systems
are highly automated and efficient forms of payment that provide services on “closed” networks
of computers. Access to all these systems is highly restricted. Merchants that accept credit cards
are carefully screened by their banks prior to being given the ability to accept credit card
payments.  ATM networks conduct transactions over dedicated phone lines. In addition to access
restrictions, several important security aspects, including encryption, ensure the privacy and
accuracy of Fedwire, ACH, credit card, and ATM network messages.  
Providing security over “open” networks, in which there are no access restrictions, is a
fundamentally different, and more difficult, problem than is the case with closed networks. An
open network is one in which the information flows over the network can be observed, or
intercepted, by a third party. For example, messages sent over the Internet presumably can be




to identify the individual sending a message from a computer linked to the network. Another
problem is how to verify that the message the individual sent has not been altered in
transmission. Yet another problem is how to safeguard the message from being “overheard” (and
understood) or redirected to some other destination. 
Answers to these problems exist. The means to accomplish these security tasks typically
involve the use of sophisticated modern cryptography, including public key cryptography. The
ways in which cryptography can safeguard electronic messages is sophisticated and elegant. The
nature of the security problem of open networks can be likened to trying to create a “virtually
closed” network.   
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A virtually closed network is one whose encryption-based security procedures are so
complete and well executed as to provide the same level of security (or even an enhanced level of
security) as exists for restricted-access or closed networks.  This is the desire of designers of the
money systems.
Fedwire and the ACH do not fully meet the designation of emoney because they are
primarily wholesale systems. The emoney development we see today is primarily in retail
payment systems.  The retail payment system in the U.S. today primarily consists of cash, checks,
credit cards, and debit cards. What forms of payment will emoney take?
To date, it has taken the form of electronic bank notes, such as the embedded-chip card
known as Mondex, or “ecash,” for transfer over open computer networks; an electronic check,
such as a system proposed by the Financial Service Technology Consortium, for transfer over6
open computer networks; and enhancements to credit card communications. Clearly, the digital
cash systems designed for transfer over the Internet are designed for use on open networks, as are
the systems to transmit credit card information. Many embedded-chip card systems too are
designed to operate in an open environment, and when I discuss such cards, I refer to those
systems. All of these systems rely on public key cryptographic security procedures to create a
"virtually closed" network to protect the content of the messages sent in the system.
An important aspect of emoney is that all three of these systems are likely to be provided
by what I’ll call retail “branded networks.”  Branded networks consist of a group of providers
that use a retail brand identification for marketing purposes and use the central organization for
establishing network operating rules, business strategy, and network operations (in the case of
emoney, a clearinghouse). The central organization may or may not be owned by members.  In
the credit card marketplace, Visa and MasterCard are owned by their members, while American
Express and Discover Card are owned by single organizations that provide a stand-alone network
to compete against the larger Visa-MasterCard networks. Some ATM networks are owned by all
members, while some are owned by a small group; still others are owned by third-party firms.  
The tendency in the larger credit card and ATM networks, however, as documented in
McAndrews and Rob (1996), is for the network to be owned by a group of “downstream” users. 
That is, for ATM networks, the largest ones tend to be owned by a group of banks that issue
ATM cards prominently marked with their own network’s brand. The underlying reason for this
type of organization is threefold. First, the need for widespread acceptance in payments means
that there is a “network externality” in demand: the value to any user is increased as other
potential users adopt the system. Second, in what is a common theme for vertical integration inIn other words, it tends to reduce, if not fully eliminate, the “double margin” of price
3
markups among the upstream and downstream sectors; see McAndrews (1996) for an illustration
of this effect.
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other industries, the tendency for downstream users to own the upstream network organization
better aligns the interests of the upstream and downstream sectors.  Finally, it is an equilibrium
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phenomenon that larger scale can be achieved through the organization of the industry in this
manner.
The Mondex system provides a classic example of this type of organization.  Mondex was
started by National Westminster Bank in the UK, and its U.S. rights have been purchased by a
coalition of 16 banks (including the AT&T credit card bank). MasterCard purchased a large
interest in the worldwide rights to Mondex. These emoney firms, then, will likely be joint
ventures of banks and technology firms, which together will establish a brand identity, a
clearinghouse for the clearing and settlement of payments, and a central organization that
determines network rules, business strategy, and enforcement policy. This type of organization of
the firm has been seen in the credit card and ATM industries.
III. Systemic Payment Risk
The growth of large-value transfers in the industrialized countries in the last decade has
increased the concern within central banks about the risks posed by these systems.  This concern
has led to significant policy actions and studies at various central banks and at the Bank for
International Settlements. A taxonomy of risks associated with payment systems is now fairly
standard. The risks are typically categorized as credit or solvency risk, liquidity risk, market risk,
Herstatt risk, fraud risk, operational risk, and systemic risk. This extensive categorization is not
mutually exclusive.8
Credit risk and market risk refer to the possibility that a settlement will not be realized at
full value. The cause of this default could be the insolvency of the counterparty to the payment;
the insolvency could be caused by the loss in market value, between the time of purchase and the
time of settlement, of the object for which the payment is intended. The settlement could be
delayed because of illiquidity of one party at the time of settlement. Herstatt (or time-gap) risk
refers to the possible consequences of  a time delay in delivery and payment (typically of two
currencies in a foreign exchange transaction). The possibility that one party could go bankrupt
after the counterparty has made payment exposes one party to default risk in the intervening
period.  Fraud risk reflects the possibility that counterparties, customers, employees, or third
parties may misrepresent themselves in ways that increase the liabilities of the payor, or in some
other way that subverts the workings of the payment system to their own benefit. Operational
risk exists in any payment system and concerns the possibility that breakdowns in the planning or
execution of the payments, such as a breakdown in the operation of the central computer, expose
the participants to unexpected liquidity shortfalls. Finally, systemic risk entails a serious liquidity
shortfall, on the part of one or several participants, that cascades to threaten the stability of all or
a large number of the system’s participants.
If we confine our consideration to retail payment systems, there is little reason to believe
that emoney will greatly add to the credit, market, and Herstatt risks in payment systems in the
short run. Most of these risks pose little danger in the context of retail payment systems. 
In the long run, both the clearance (the exchange of information about payments entered
into the system) and the settlement (final discharge of payment obligations) of emoney payments
will likely take place through the branded network. Settlement may occur in the short run acrossFor example, in the Lamfalussy report (Bank for International Settlements, 1990).
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established bank settlement systems. These bank settlement systems then will experience larger
volumes of business, but not problems of a different nature. Also, in the long run, settlements
will most likely move away from the Fed settlement system (associated with check clearance)
and toward the private settlement systems associated with the emoney branded networks.
Liquidity risk is always with us, and possibly this risk will be increased in certain emoney
systems for a number of reasons. Electronic bank note systems foresee placing all the system’s
assets and liabilities in a special-purpose bank. The liquidity arrangements for these institutions
will have to be well designed because the private settlement systems of the branded emoney
networks will be designed as net, rather than gross, settlement systems. Netting systems, by
economizing on liquidity, are typically less costly to the participants. Recent research by
Emmons (1995), Kahn and Roberds (1996), and Lacker (1996) suggests that private netting
systems tend to shift settlement risk to the deposit insurer. They also expend too many resources
and tend to be subject to greater risk of failure than do gross systems. Because of the substitution
of private net settlement systems for the central bank gross settlement system, the long-run
development of emoney could add to the liquidity and systemic settlement risk in society.
As I will discuss in the section on emoney competition, emoney systems are likely to
proliferate in the near term, followed by a gradual winnowing out of the systems. Research and
policy work at the Bank for International Settlements has suggested that netting systems must be
well designed to accomplish a possible reduction in settlement risk.   With systems proliferating
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in the short run, close attention should be paid to a system’s risk controls.  
Another area that gives rise to concern about liquidity risk is the role of nonbanks. While10
nonbanks typically disclaim the role of issuer, the legal liability in the case of failure because of
the performance of a nonbank and the ability of the system to perform should a nonbank become
illiquid are important factors that may pose liquidity risks to the system.
For fraud and operational risk, emoney systems present new risks to banks and payment
systems.  Fraud is of great concern to operators of all payment systems. Most systems attempt to
counter the possibility for fraudulent entry of payment orders by erecting elaborate firewalls that
prevent unauthorized access to the system. The Federal Reserve, for example, knows the physical
device from which a message is received, and the users of Federal Reserve payment services
have passwords that they must reveal prior to gaining entry into a specific application, such as the
ACH. Dedicated lines increase the level of assurance that the passwords have not been
intercepted. 
The open networks across which emoney will be transmitted require a whole new
apparatus to prevent fraudulent access to the system. Because of the ability to intercept messages
in open networks, passwords are insufficient to prevent criminals from entering the system— 
hence, the need for heavily encrypted messages. Because individuals and the transactions they
make will not be identified with a specific physical device (except for the case where certain
types of smart cards come to dominate money), the need to identify individuals (in the context of
open networks), or individual notes, requires new methods of identification—hence, the digital
signature and digital certificate. 
The insufficiency of passwords in a world in which appearances deceive is demonstrated
by the case of the fraudulent ATM. In May 1993 two criminals placed an ATM in a Connecticut
mall.  The ATM had popular network logos on it and was being run with software designed toSee “The Case of the Phony ATM Nears an End,” Bank Network News, July 12, 1993.
5
See the remarks of Stephen Cohn, vice president, Network Security, BBN Corporation,
6
“Principles of Public Key Infrastructure,” presented at the FBMA CyberPayments ‘96
Conference, June 1996, Dallas, Texas.
11
simulate a working ATM, but it was, in fact, not connected to any ATM network switch. Instead,
the ATM would allow people to place their card in the machine and enter their password (their
personal identification number, or PIN). The machine would then report that it was out of
service. The criminals then used the card numbers and PINs they had collected to counterfeit new
cards and steal over $100,000. They were later arrested.
5
This crime is an archetype of the fraud that is possible over the Internet. Something more
than logos or pretty pictures must be shown to establish the true identity of the merchant with
which the customer wishes to trade. The same goes for the merchant regarding the customer’s
identity. The public key infrastructure is intended to fill this gap in electronic communications.
The need for the new security apparatus or infrastructure to protect the integrity of
payment instructions in an emoney world places significant burdens on the designers and
sponsors of these systems. Creating a new “public key infrastructure,” as it has been called, is an
enormous undertaking, requiring a high degree of coordination among a wide variety of
participants.   
6
A few of the issues that confront the participants in this effort include the degree of
standardization across different systems (the federal government, for example, has chosen as its
standard for the digital signature one that is different from the one typically employed by
business); the willingness to accept a particular authority as providing a valid digital certificate;
the amount of credit risk a certificate authority may assume as a result of issuing a digitalSee Andrew Pollack, “Counterfeiters of a New Stripe Give Japan One More Worry: Fake
7
Cards Thwart Efforts to End Pinball Crime,” New York Times, Thursday, June 20, 1996, Col.2,
Pg.1, Section D.
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certificate, either by contract, law, or court decision; the compatibility of the hardware employed
by the different systems; and the different users of the systems. Daunting though this list may be,
the longer there is only partial resolution of these issues, the greater the possibility for criminals
to slip through the interstices of the security system. Fraud can creep into a heavily encrypted
system through the system’s hardware, without ever compromising the encryption.  
The recent case of massive fraud in Japanese Pachinko parlors is instructive in this
regard.  The National Police Agency of Japan, in concert with Sumitomo, Mitsubishi
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Corporation, and Nippon Telephone and Telegraph, designed a heavily encrypted, counterfeit-
proof magnetic stripe prepaid card to be used in Pachinko parlors, in an effort to rid the parlors of
cash and the associated tax evasion. Although the card readers were heavily guarded, organized
gangs managed to steal the machines and reverse-engineer the process for writing to the cards. 
Rather than counterfeiting the counterfeit-proof cards, the gangs recycled used cards and wrote
over them. They never had to crack the encryption on the cards.  The losses sustained by the
system’s sponsors were reported to exceed $600 million.  
There are at least two lessons to take away from this episode.  Where there is a prize of
this size available for the taking, we can expect extensive efforts to break the security system. 
Furthermore, encryption is only one component of the security system of readers, authentication
devices, and devices that can write value to chips or magnetic stripe cards; it is a significant
challenge to make all facets of the system as secure in practice as the best encryption systems are
in theory.See “Bank Computer Fails, Disrupts US Securities,” American Banker, November 25,
8
1985, and “Aftermath of an Avalanche: Closer EFT Scrutiny,” Bank Network News, September
13, 1995 for descriptions of these events.
A “networked product” means forms of emoney that will use physical networks of the
9
Internet and other systems of compatible hardware devices (such as embedded-chip cards and
their readers) and software.
The type of attack that one might expect over open networks was seen recently when an
10
Internet access provider was shut down by an adversary that directed thousands of messages per
second to the provider.  The rate of incoming messages exceeded the computer facility’s ability
to recognize messages and, in that way, overwhelmed the facility. 
13
Operational disruptions also pose a similar risk to the stability of the system.  There are
numerous examples of severe problems caused by failures of operations: the Bank of New
York’s computer problem, which resulted in a $22 billion overdraft in 1985; the “worm” virus
that disrupted the operation of the Internet in 1987; the shutdown—caused by a roof collapse
after a heavy snow—of an Electronic Data Systems facility for processing ATM transactions in
1993, which affected over 5000 ATMs across the nation.  Since emoney is a networked product,
8
the processing of many emoney transactions will take place in centralized switch facilities.  Any
9
interruption in the operation of the software supporting the system—because of a virus, for
example—or of the centralized switching facility—because of a sustained attack on the facility
by an adversary—can conceivably interrupt the whole payment system.  The process of creating
10
and installing software and its updates, the development of new generations of hardware, and the
establishment of security procedures all leave room for glitches to occur. Here again, operational
risk is not solved merely by having a backup facility but involves a host of considerations that
encompass the design of the whole system. 
Based on the discussion of the typical settlement risk issues posed by emoney, one might“Making E-Money Anonymous,” David Chaum, presented at “The Future of Money in
11
the Information Age,” Cato Institute’s 14th Annual Monetary Conference, May 23, 1996.
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imagine that emoney would not raise new or additional systemic concerns for the banking and
payment systems. However, the fraud and operational risks in emoney systems are, in many
conceivable cases, risks of a systemic nature. Indeed, systemic risks in the context of emoney
systems pose new challenges to payment providers. David Chaum, president of the DigiCash
Corporation and an expert cryptographer, has pointed out a shortcoming of the Mondex system (a
competitor to DigiCash’s smart-card system): Mondex allows person-to-person transfer, which
opens the possibility of the total collapse of the Mondex system if an organized criminal group
were to compromise the security of one card.  By compromising one card (or one card reader in
11
the case of the Japanese Pachinko card scheme), a criminal organization could transfer funds to
other cards ad infinitum, eroding the value of even 100 percent backing.15
IV. Issue of Private Notes in the U.S.
Private issue of bank notes—private banks’ liabilities that function as currency—was a
widespread practice in the Free Banking era of 1837 to 1863. There were significant differences
in banking and payment system stability between the Free Banking era and the National Bank era
of 1863 to 1914. According to research by Rolnick and Weber (1985), the Free Banking era,
while characterized by many individual bank failures, did not suffer widespread banking and
payment system panics. The National Bank period, on the other hand, suffered seven widespread
panics that involved suspension of convertibility of deposits into currency. Why the difference in
performance of the two eras?
The free banks, so-called because of the relatively easy entry into banking in various
states, were state chartered and could issue notes, typically backed by state-issued bonds. The
notes did not always trade at par. In fact, specialized publications, called Bank Note Reporters, 
monitored the prices of the numerous notes in circulation and reported on types of counterfeits as
well. If the market perception was that the bonds backing a particular bank's notes were likely to
default, the bank's notes would trade at a greater discount from par. Rolnick and Weber find that
the contagion effect—failure in one bank triggering a panic in other banks—did not operate.
Their explanation asserts that the backing for the state bank notes was transparent. Since banks
did not have large interbank liabilities as a result of clearing notes, note holders could adequately
distinguish the risks of holding the notes of various banks, discounting the prices of those whose
backing was weak, thus leaving the other notes and banks unaffected.
In the National Bank era, bank notes declined as a percentage of the money supply, as
Congress placed a 10 percent tax on the issue of state bank notes, and deposits rose in16
substitution. National banks issued bank notes backed by federal government bonds, which didn’t
suffer the default risk associated with some of the state-issued bonds in the earlier era.  Deposit
money was backed by whatever the bank had on hand as assets— a mixture of loans and
securities. Hence, the backing for deposit money was less transparent than the backing for either
the national bank notes or the state bank notes of the Free Banking era. Furthermore, the system
of payment by check necessitated a clearing and settlement mechanism that was far more
elaborate than that for bank notes. Although banks often imposed "exchange fees" to settle a
check drawn on one of its accounts, checks of individual banks were not discounted as bank
notes were in the Free Banking era. Within systems of correspondent banks, and within the
developing check clearinghouses—many of which survive today—checks were settled essentially
at par, with only a tiny, standardized exchange fee being collected.
There are three salient differences, then, between the bank note money of the Free
Banking era and the deposit money of the National Bank era.  First, the backing for state bank
notes was more transparent—its value was more easily determined—than for deposit money. 
Second, the bank notes traded at bank-specific discounts, related to the value of the backing of
the notes, while deposit money traded essentially at par (in any case at par less an exchange
charge unrelated to the value of the backing of the deposit).  Third, the system for clearing the
deposits was more elaborate, necessitating the creation of clearinghouses and extensive
correspondent networks. Consequently, in the National Bank era, more significant interbank
liabilities were involved in the clearing process than in the Free Banking era. 
Each of these differences is implicated in the panics of the National Bank era.  Little
transparency in the value of a bank's assets meant little hope for explicit pricing of deposits, in17
contrast to the case bank notes. Hence, uninformed depositors could learn nothing from the
exchangeability of their deposit money until it was too late. If backing for deposits consisted of
general bank assets, then near business-cycle peaks, when the value of the average bank’s assets
is expected to decline, a depositor would be more concerned about the value of his own bank's
assets. Gorton (1988) has shown that all of the panics occurred near business-cycle peaks (and
that most, but not all, business-cycle peaks involved panics). Furthermore, more elaborate
interbank clearing systems maintained par exchangeability within the clearinghouse. So when
any one member was threatened by a run, the other members were more likely to be forced into a
suspension of convertibility themselves because of interbank liabilities that underlay the
settlement process. The depositors of clearinghouse members did not know how much of their
own deposits were backed by “due froms” of the threatened clearinghouse member.
If these features of the deposit system in the National Bank era tended to preclude the
dissemination of bank-specific information by means of explicit pricing of the bank’s deposit
liabilities, they also contributed to a much more efficient payment system than existed in the Free
Banking era.  The more generalized acceptance of a monetary instrument at par--National Bank
notes away from home, and checks in the local area—lessened the costs of transactions
throughout the economy. The necessity of consulting Bank Note Reporters in the Free Banking
era and the uncertainty associated with accepting state bank notes were a costly and, I would
argue, a socially wasteful process for making payments.
V.  Emoney Competition
Emoney competition is itself a possible source of instability in the banking and payment
systems. Emoney falls into three broad categories: enhancements to credit card systems,18
electronic checks, and electronic bank notes, and as I pointed out previously, competition will
primarily take place among firms organized as joint ventures that conduct business as a “branded
network.” Today, the credit card marketplace and the ATM card marketplace are already ones in
which competition is, to a large extent, a competition among such brands. Hence, we can take
these markets as paradigms for the type of competition likely to develop in other forms of
emoney.  
This type of organization for issuance of notes is quite different from the way notes were
issued in the Free Banking era, in that they will be issued by a coalition of a joint venture’s
members and participants, rather than by an individual bank. It is different, too, from the more
wholesale organization of the clearinghouses of the National Bank era in that the branded
networks will be integrated into both the wholesale (or clearinghouse) and retail (or brand
marketing) ends of the market.  Several aspects of network competition are worth reviewing for
their possible impact on the stability of the payment system.
One observed regularity of competition in such markets is illustrated by the ATM
industry. McAndrews (1991) documents that there was a rapid proliferation of ATM networks in
the 1980s, cresting at almost 200 different branded ATM networks serving the nation. 
Subsequently, because of the desire for ubiquitous access by consumers, and because of
economies of scale in operations, this number has dwindled to fewer than 50 today. In fact, in
1995 only 20 major brands accounted for 95 percent of ATM activity. A similar dynamic pattern,
although with fewer firms, characterized the credit card industry. We can expect the same to
occur in electronic bank notes and electronic checks. The early competition is a race for “critical
mass”: the number of consumers and merchants necessary to provide a useful, convenient, andSee “Antitrust in Network Industries,” an address by Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant
12
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, before the American Law
Institute and American Bar Association, January 25, 1996, for an overview of competitive
practices of firms in network industries.
19
widely accepted payment product, even if others compete for the same business.  Not all of the
entrants will succeed in reaching a critical mass of acceptance.
In network industries, a brand that can quickly establish a large base of users holds a
significant advantage. We see in Visa and MasterCard two dominant competitors in the credit
card marketplace. Given their “duality” agreement, which allows a bank to belong to both of the
systems, there has been no entry into the bank credit card marketplace. Indeed, American Express
is currently challenging a Visa rule that forbids a bank both to belong to Visa and to issue
American Express credit cards. Being an early leader and requiring exclusive membership can
provide significant business advantages, both in achieving the necessary scale to succeed and in
deterring potential competitors from entering the industry. This incentive is a key ingredient in
causing the rapid proliferation of firms early in the product’s life cycle.
The nature of the competition in branded network products itself can be a stability
concern in that the competition among the networks can lead to instability in market shares.  
12
For example, suppose we have two branded network clearinghouses competing in the same
market and they each need (and have) 50 percent of the market, thus obtaining the critical mass
of users necessary to make them cost-efficient and sufficiently convenient versus other methods
of payment. Because of a merger of member banks, one bank migrates from network A to
network B. Suddenly network A is inefficient relative to other payment methods and relative to
network B. There is a “run” on the payment instrument offered by A. Now, if branded network BSee “EPS’ Antitrust Concerns Aren’t Over Yet,” Bank Network News, March 27, 1995.
13
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can quickly handle the increased volume from the former members of A, this may not cause a big
problem. But if it can’t, systemic problems can arise. In the extreme case, an operational problem
caused by the increase in system load may cause significant problems in B and, therefore, for all
users of that type of emoney. 
Of course, it is an admittedly extreme example to suppose there is a knife-edge critical
mass below which the firms cannot fall. But it is a feature of network competition that a critical
mass of users is necessary to enter a market or, if a firm is already in the market, to continue to
provide services economically. Hence, it is a feature of network competition that networks that
steadily lose market share can fail quickly once it is believed that the network’s market share will
fall below the level necessary to maintain a critical mass.  
In the ATM market, the Quest network in Kentucky provides an example. Several owner-
member firms of the Quest network joined other networks. Although the Quest network was
planning to offer new products and services, it suddenly announced its closure in 1995, because it
had lost the ability to maintain a critical mass of users.  This does not cause a huge problem in
13
the ATM marketplace because the banks can establish links quickly with alternative providers
that can easily handle the increased scale of business. But the problem can be significant if
networks have practiced exclusivity (that is, not allowed users to connect to alternative suppliers)
or pursued incompatibility (that is, used devices that will not accept the messages of other
suppliers). 
Exclusivity and incompatibility are strategic choices of firms to achieve acceptance.  
Exclusivity is a strategy to enforce agents that issue a certain brand of emoney to issue no other21
brand of emoney at the same time. Incompatibility would be achieved with a different security
system or other features of the software system that would make communication across different
networks practically impossible. Both strategies have long histories in network industries, and
both can be justified in economic models, at least for networks that do not dominate their
markets. We can expect some emoney competition to be characterized by these practices. 
However, in the context of system stability, they have the unfortunate effect of limiting the
ability of the issuers of one system (which may have failed) to quickly migrate to another system
because of the time necessary to install and test the incompatible system. 
There are advantages to the prospect of branded network competition, as I have outlined
it, in the emoney world. Perhaps monetary exchange in the Free Banking era was impeded by the
regrettable necessity of consulting Bank Note Reporters for many transactions. The lack of
uniformity of backing for bank notes--even though their backing may have been
transparent—was a costly bother when one considers the advantages of a widely accepted means
of exchange.  Branded networks would work to overcome this problem, at least for electronic
bank notes. By placing the backing for the electronic notes in the branded network bank, the
networks may prevent the type of confusion over the value of the backing that the National Bank
era clearinghouses suffered when one of their members failed or suffered a run.  Assets that back
electronic checks will likely stay on the books of individual banks.  But electronic checks, which
are likely to be covered by deposit insurance, do not suffer the problems associated with checks
in the National Bank era.  
There are some disadvantages associated with the prospect of network competition as
well. For example, in the event of a failure or interruption in the operation of the network bank,      This is based on personal communication with officials of Visa and MasterCard.  To my
14
knowledge the organizations do not have formal rules for loss sharing in this instance--the
issuing banks had already made payment to the merchant banks, which then failed before making
payment to the merchant.
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the issuer banks will most likely face demands by customers to honor the system’s liabilities. 
Some network business strategies that emphasize incompatibility and exclusivity leave the
system unable to cope with the failure of one of the competing networks.
A final issue concerning the likely organization of emoney firms as joint ventures of firms
is, who issues the money? First, let’s focus on the electronic bank note. Who is the issuer of the
electronic bank note? Is it Mondex (or some alternative branded network), or a member bank of
Mondex? This may be a trivial question in the sense that for credit cards the same type of
organization has been operative for many years. But Visa and MasterCard have faced the issue of
merchant banks that go bankrupt owing merchants tens of millions of dollars. The central
organizations have not hesitated to pay the merchants to protect the brand.  This blurs the
14
distinction between the issuer and the network and raises the question of where the liability for
an electronic note lies.
Suppose a bank goes bankrupt after having issued electronic notes (not covered by
deposit insurance). News of the bank’s failure is known quickly. Is there an increased risk of
failure of the branded network organization?  The clearinghouses found themselves in this
situation in the National Bank era. For the electronic note, Mondex and the proposed SmartCash
organization plan to forestall any problems of this sort by putting funds from the sale of
electronic notes into a special “bank” in which all electronic note liabilities and assets to back
those liabilities are held.  Presumably then the failure of a bank would not affect the      However, as we just pointed out, it does not absolve issuing banks of residual liability in the
15
event of failure of the branded network bank. 
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creditworthiness of a note it issued. But how would the failure of the branded network bank
affect the issuing bank? Would its customers—holders of electronic notes it issued—be satisfied
with the answer that it had no liability to them? Indeed, a bank cannot assume that it is absolved
of liability in all instances because it deposited all assets and liabilities that back electronic notes
in the branded network bank.
For electronic checks the failure of an individual bank once again could jeopardize the
solvency of the branded network clearinghouse if individuals felt that the interbank liabilities
were of sufficient size to imperil the value of the assets of the clearinghouse. It is not clear how
the electronic check providers plan to organize the clearinghouses, but it is likely that
individuals’ deposit accounts will stay on the books of the individuals’ banks and that the
clearinghouse for electronic checks will look much like conventional clearinghouses. This
subjects them, though, to the same lack of transparency that plagued the clearinghouses of the
National Bank era. The difference is that the electronic check will most likely be protected by
deposit insurance; therefore, the clearinghouse’s balance sheet is less likely to be a concern for
systemic stability.
Based on the experience of the National Bank era, it is a sensible idea for the issuers of
electronic notes to place all the associated assets and liabilities in the centralized (clearinghouse)
branded network bank. This increases transparency of the backing of the issue and reduces the
concern when a member issuing bank fails.   The experience of the Free Banking era suggests
15
that there are advantages to issuing notes through a branded network.  Such a network, if ofSee Chapters 1 and 7 of Bruce Schneier’s Applied Cryptography (1993).
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sufficient size, can increase the acceptability of the bank’s notes and reduce the discount (to zero)
on the notes by enforcing standard backing for them. One question to ask of these specialized
banks is, how much liquidity should they hold against electronic notes? The answer is that,
because of fraud risk, 100 percent backing may be insufficient. The risk of what we might call
digital counterfeiting is that if it is done well, it can wipe out the reserves of any system. The
danger of this for the designers of emoney payments is that the threat of counterfeiting may
trigger a run on the bank that can also break the bank. While in the Free Banking era
counterfeiting (and the threat of counterfeiting) would affect the prices and acceptability of a
bank’s notes, the problem of counterfeiting in the emoney world can threaten the systemic
stability of banks. The situation is similar for operational risks in large networks, which can
cause significant problems for all the users of the network, with implications for the system’s
stability.   
VI. Conclusion: Lessons for Regulation and Control of the Payment and Banking Systems
The fraud and operational risks associated with the emoney world will require solutions
to new problems. It is not clear how to protect new systems from fraud. Cryptographers place
greater trust in a cryptographic system that has been known and used for a long time without
being cracked.  Among algorithms of equal mathematical complexity, there is no generally
16
accepted way to judge the efficacy of cryptographic security other than experience. Hence, we
can see the difficulties of judging and foreseeing the weak spots in a cryptographic-based security
system on open computer networks.




lower the amount of value the cards could carry. This action greatly lowers the net benefit of the
counterfeit operation, since, in that case, there was a fixed cost to reusing a used card and writing
over it. As the value per counterfeit is lowered, the net benefits to counterfeiting fall. Other
responses included placing stronger controls on the merchants (the Pachinko parlor operators)
who were tolerating obvious fraud (sometimes because of physical threats made by the criminals)
in their stores.
The first response corresponds with the cryptographic wisdom that the cost of computing
necessary to break a code should exceed the possible gains from breaking it. Therefore, one
lesson from these experiences is that the value of retail emoney systems should be of limited
amounts. One would think that self-regulation and the risk-aversion of banks would be sufficient
to enforce this commonsensical recommendation, but the Japanese case gives one pause in this
regard. Moreover, the criticisms from cryptographers concerning the design characteristics of the
Mondex system, combined with the discovery of a possible way to compromise the security of a
Mondex card, suggest that the risk of counterfeiting will continue to be of concern for these
systems.
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The operational problems that we’ve seen in networked payment products, such as the
failure at the EDS processing facility, are preventable to the extent that backup facilities are
available to fill the gap. I’ve argued that because of the possibility of rapid migration of
customers from one system to another, the planning for backup systems is difficult and may be
impossible in a run. Of course, because of the networked nature of emoney, backup facilities26
alone do not address the need for recovery in a crisis; the backup facility may suffer from the
same virus that caused the problem in the primary facility.
The uncertainty concerning fraud and operational problems gives rise to the risk of a run
on an emoney system. If the public believes that a system’s security has been compromised, they
may well attempt to shift funds away from the threatened system. This makes important both the
liquidity facilities of an emoney system, and the ability of the system to credibly detect and
contain fraud and operational problems. 
The importance of sufficient liquidity in a payment system clearinghouse is a well-known
issue in central banking. In the case of emoney, one novel aspect concerns the role of nonbanks
in the provision of payments and the degree to which they will hold adequate reserves for their
issuance of actual money (in the form of an emoney system, such as stored-value cards).  Another
likely result of the development of emoney is the proliferation of private net settlement
arrangements within the branded emoney networks. Research by McAndrews and Wasilyew
(1995) suggests that even retail net settlement systems, if composed of large number of firms,
can lead to significant systemic risk.  
Research by McAndrews and Roberds (1995) shows that clearinghouses that can’t
compel firms to join, or that have limited enforcement powers, are at risk of insufficient
provision of reserves as member banks attempt to free ride on the liquidity of their fellow
members. This suggests that the Federal Reserve System is the appropriate authority to establish
emoney reserve requirements if needed, to monitor and examine the clearinghouses or special-
purpose banks of the emoney systems, and to be an enforcement authority over them. As Gilbert
and Summers (1996) point out, some new legislation may be required for the Fed to have this27
authority. Ultimately, the Fed will be the institution to which these systems turn in a time of
crisis, for the lender of last resort is the only agent in the economy that can access liquidity at
will.  The Fed should have the authority to supervise them, to enforce liquidity provisions that
are prudent, and to maintain other standards of operation and risk controls by which modern
clearinghouses operate.
The competitive practices of the nascent branded network payment systems will display
typical features of network industries. There will be a proliferation of systems, followed by a
reduction in the number of independent systems. If some systems should fail quickly, other
policies of the competitors can lead to systemic risks. There will be various policies in the
different systems, and these policies will be concerned with access to the systems by competitive
and complementary system operators and participants; competing standards for products that
seek to serve the same market; compatibility among providers’ hardware and software;
exclusivity agreements among providers and their customers; and the ability to leverage the
market power in one product into a dominant position in other products. Such competitive
practices, while of antitrust concern for large networks (such as Visa and MasterCard), are
potentially at issue regarding payment system stability. The possibility exists for a network to
lose critical mass and fail rapidly. This can lead to instability of the payment system if other
providers use incompatible technology or are unable to quickly add customers. At the same time
some competition among systems is likely to reveal design successes and failures that would not
be discovered with a single approach to creating emoney systems.
The emoney world will be unlike the Free Banking era in that it will be coalitions of
banks tied together in a branded retail network that will provide emoney—one form of which28
will be an electronic bank note. For the electronic bank note, the branded network will likely set
up a special-purpose bank to hold the assets and liabilities associated with the issued notes. This
arrangement will provide transparency of backing, but it will likely not eliminate all the risks of
system failure from the banks. Consequently, banks will retain some risk. Because the electronic
check may well have the advantage of deposit insurance, an advantage missing in the National
Bank era, it is, in and of itself, not a cause for instability in the banking or payment system. As in
the electronic bank note, though, the electronic check will be as much identified with a branded
retail network as with the bank that holds the deposit. Banks have experience with this fact in the
credit card marketplace.
The organization of emoney firms as branded joint ventures of banks and technology
firms gives rise to the uncertainty of who bears the risk of loss under various circumstances. For
example, suppose someone steals my digital signature (one means of identification in emoney
systems) because of a technology snafu. Does the technology firm that issued the keys to my
digital signature bear the loss that occurs when someone then accesses my bank deposit account? 
Suppose a merchant loads counterfeit change onto my electronic bank note card (while I
complied with all the rules of the network). Does the bank honor it? How is the consumer to
know the answer to such questions?  
I’d like to suggest a “Truth in Minting” act for emoney that spells out the liability and
procedures to resolve problems in case of counterfeiting (when a consumer has no way of
knowing that counterfeit money is being loaded on to his card), operational failure, theft of
security devices (such as the digital identification system of customers), and financial failure of
the firm.  Such disclosures are important in winning the acceptance of emoney; assuring the29
public that the joint venture has thought through the consequences of counterfeiting, theft of
identification devices, and so on; and stemming any runs that might be initiated because of
uncertainty about these policies (in a time when rumors circulate about possible counterfeits, for
example).
I’d also like to suggest further research on the implications of the movement from public
to private settlement systems. I’ve already noted a number of articles in that area, but more needs
to be done to assist policymakers in the transition to this new system of payment settlement in
our economy. Further research on the industrial organization of financial branded network
industries, on the issues of fraud and operational risks in emoney systems, and on the roles
disclosure and liability limits can play in the development of risky technologies would all be
useful.  
The emoney world is one of great promise, partly because of the convenience that it may
bring to consumers. But it comes with its own set of risks, which are more likely to be risks of
fraud (including counterfeit) and operational risks. The role of nonbanks in the provision of
emoney is likely to raise a new concern of adequate liquidity for such firms. Furthermore, the
nature of competition among branded retail networks raises the possibility that, just as a firm can
quickly gain dominance in such an industry, so too can a firm quickly fail.  
All of these issues raise concerns about the stability of the banking and payment systems
in the emoney world.  There is no way to avoid this world or its risks. However, system operators
should learn the lessons of previous failures in similar systems and limit the possible profits
obtainable from fraud. Redundancy in operating facilities and extensive testing will certainly
need to be standard in emoney systems. The Fed should have the ability to examine and supervise30
the clearinghouses associated with the provision of emoney. Emoney providers should have well-
understood procedures to resolve problems and to detect and stem losses from counterfeiting or
other fraud. Consumers should be informed of these system guidelines to reduce the uncertainty
that otherwise exists. Such uncertainty increases the probability of a run on a system rumored to
be under attack from counterfeiters.31
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